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Introduction
Monteiro, Musten and Compson (2015) have highlighted
three important areas for assessing contemporary
mindfulness-based interventions (MBIs) in light of traditional
Buddhist conceptions. First is the adherence of contemporary
presentations to fundamental elements of “right mindfulness”.
The second question is whether the practices taught in MBIs
lead to insight into the roots of suffering or instead offer only
more symptomatic relief. A third area of critique regards
whether the presentation of MBIs should explicitly include
the ethical context in whichmindfulness is traditionally taught.
Each of these areas is crucial for understanding both the
potential and also the pitfalls for the modern development of
MBIs. I suggest that questions about whether MBIs ought to
adhere to Buddhist visions of right mindfulness and of ethical
action can only be answered, if at all, as part of a continuing
dialogue on the very general ethical question of how it is best
for a human being to be. However, questions about the causes
of suffering and how to most effectively address them may
serve as an area of common concern across human cultures
that can be appealed to as a basis for such dialogues on ethics.
A number of the articles in the recent issue of Contempo-
rary Buddhism (January, 2011) have contrasted various Bud-
dhist textual characterizations of right mindfulness with con-
temporary presentations of mindfulness as non-judgmental
present-centered attention. In these debates, it can often sound
as if the definition of right mindfulness (Pāli sammā-sati) is
fixed by the tradition(s) and the question is whether contem-
porary presentations in various MBIs adhere to this authorita-
tive definition. However, it is important to recognize that in
the context of mindfulness teachings, both ancient and con-
temporary, the notion of right mindfulness functions first and
foremost as an ethical term. This is true quite aside from points
about whether sammā is best translated as “right”. Instead, the
point is that both religious and secular teachers of mindfulness
use the term “mindfulness” to present aspects of the vision of
human flourishing that they and their own cultural tradition
endorse. If one thinks that the development of a non-
judgmental present-centered attention is one of the most valu-
able ways for human beings to develop themselves, then that
will play a central role in one’s presentation of mindfulness
practice. On the other hand, some individuals and practice
traditions might hold instead that such a non-judgmental
present-centered attention is not sufficient, or perhaps not
even necessary, for a human being to cultivate what is most
valuable. If so, their textual and oral presentations of mindful-
ness practice are likely to stress other aspects, such as analyt-
ical and evaluative contemplative practices.
The controversy over the possibility of a mindful sniper,
noted by Monteiro et al., exemplifies the breadth of ethical
vision that is at stake in defining right mindfulness. To say that
the mindfulness of a sniper does not amount to right mindful-
ness is to say that human beings ought to cultivate other
qualities instead of or (more likely) in addition to the kinds
of focused attention that are important for being an effective
sniper. For instance, it might be that cultivating a more open-
monitoring style of attention training would result in feeling
more fully the pain involved in the embodied motivation to
cause harm, and thus would be incompatible with being a
soldier. Indeed, the comprehensiveness of what is at stake in
definingmindfulness is explicit in Kabat-Zinn’s (2011, p. 290)
recent remark that in certain contexts, he has used the term
mindfulness as a placeholder for a “universal dharma that is
co-extensive, if not identical, with the teachings of the Bud-
dha, the Buddhadharma.” Of course, it should not be naively
assumed that different practice traditions all lead to the same
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universal goal, path, or truth. Different individuals, different
practice traditions, and different cultures hold different visions
of how it is best for a human being to be. And if so, it should
not be surprising that presentations of mindfulness will vary
within traditional contexts, as well as between traditional and
modern contexts. Even if we did have access to the Buddha’s
own words on what is to count as right mindfulness, there is
hardly a cross-cultural consensus that we ought to accept the
Buddha as the authority on how a human being ought to be.
No appeal to authority will settle the question of whether
MBIs adhere to right mindfulness, precisely because what is
at issue is which qualities and understandings are the ones that
a human being ought to cultivate. To settle that question
would require nothing short of an answer to the ethical ques-
tion of how it is best for a human being to be.
The Pāli Nikāyas do present a relatively consistent vision
of how a human being ought to be. For one, as a whole, these
discourses are very clear that we ought to purify ourselves of
greed, hatred, and delusion. Such Buddhist textual claims
about which motivational states are to be cultivated, and
which are not, do seem to be intended as universal ethical
claims, or at least as applicable to all human beings. Monteiro
et al. noted this point, citing scholars such as Gombrich and
Keown, and went on to draw out an implication for the
inclusion of ethics in MBI pedagogy.
…because intentions are either virtuous or not, they
cannot differ from one social group to another. Applying
this idea to an MBI program, it suggests that the inclu-
sion of an ethical framework in the form of ethical
intentions likely would pose no threat to the social or
religious identification that participants may hold.
However, from the fact that Buddhist texts claim that their
own ethical judgments of various motivational states are uni-
versally correct, it hardly follows that Buddhist ethical judg-
ments are indeed universally correct! Many other cultural
traditions would also claim universality for their own (very
different) visions of how human beings out to be. Monteiro
et al. conceded that different behavioral manifestations of the
universal value of respect, say, might result in conflicts over
“religious and cultural differences in attire”. However, the
problem is much larger than this. Two cultures might both
value compassion, and yet in one of these cultures, maintain-
ing a family’s honor takes precedence, resulting in practices
such as “honor killings”. Likewise, some modern liberals
might value righteous anger towards injustice, whereas many
traditional Buddhists will see this as misguided.
To impose a pedagogy based implicitly on a Buddhist
vision of how human beings should be onto those who do
not already accept such a vision may itself be ethically prob-
lematic. So there is a strong argument to be made against
MBIs simply laying out Buddhist precepts as the correct
context within which to train in mindfulness, without some
dialogue on the question of whether these are the best ethical
guidelines to adopt, and, if so, why. At a minimum, this might
involve dialogical practices of clarifying the values that indi-
vidual students bring to an MBI course. In practice, such
explicit clarification in conjunction with explicit strategies
for strengthening individuals’ resolve to embody the values
they already hold may be sufficient to allay many of the
concerns noted by Monteiro et al. Nonetheless, from some
traditional Buddhist perspectives, such an approach will ap-
pear insufficient. In part, this is because contemporary indi-
viduals’ values, even once they have been clarified, will likely
differ in some respects from various traditional Buddhist
perspectives. However, as noted above in the context of
discussions of right mindfulness, traditional Buddhist ethical
visions differ in ways large and small from one another, as
well. Moreover, as guides for us today, even the most textually
and historically rigorous presentations of traditional concepts
of right mindfulness and of right action can at best be taken as
suggestions for further inquiry. We can decide to defer to
others (our own cultural lineage, a teacher from an exotic
tradition) for answers to question about how best to live, but
that decision to defer is itself a decision, and as such subject to
reflective scrutiny.
The problem of differing visions of human flourishing is
raised also by the further critique that secular applications of
mindfulness may provide only symptomatic relief of suffer-
ing. From many traditional perspectives, the ultimate goal of
mindfulness practice is to achieve liberation from the cycle of
rebirth. MBIs are not presented in a context in which that
specifically Buddhist metaphysical vision can be assumed,
and so they cannot realistically hope to motivate (many of)
their students by appealing to the prospect of liberation from
rebirth. However, the Buddhist ideal of realizing the cessation
of anguish and unease—dukkha—may in fact provide a note
of consilience between traditional and secular presentations.
To the degree that some specific traditional conception does
not involve eliminating all kinds of dukkha in this very life,
then to that degree, neither can MBIs be expected to achieve
that. Conversely, to the degree that the cession of anguish and
unease is something that can in principle be achieved in a
human life, through traditional practices of training universal-
ly human cognitive faculties, then it is not clear why MBI
interventions involving training attention in the right ways
could not, in principle, achieve the same goal. Of course,
many of us in a secular Western context may be sufficiently
content with a reduction of some symptoms of dukkha that we
do not persevere on to address its deepest roots in the mind.
On the other hand, that seems to be the case for many tradi-
tional Buddhists as well, the metaphysical visions of rebirth
and liberation they may hold notwithstanding.
The most important and most challenging critique of mind-
fulness teachings in our contemporary context, to my mind, is
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one that applies equally to traditional Buddhist presentations as
well as to modern MBIs. The challenge in both arenas is for
teachers to justify their (different) ends as well as their (different)
means, in the context of a cross-cultural dialogue about how it is
best for human beings to be, by appealing to considerations that
have force for all human beings. Arguably, the aim to most
effectively reduce anguish and unease can provide just such a
universal starting point for conversations focused on how hu-
man beings ought to be motivated. One way to formulate such a
proposal is to evaluate actions on the basis of whether they
reduce aggregate suffering in the world. However, a different
approachmore in line with the Pāli Nikāyas is to focus onwhich
sorts of motivational states are characterized by ease, and which
by unease, for the agents themselves (Davis, forthcoming).
Nonetheless, the point should not be to establish as true
some one traditional Buddhist vision of ethics. Rather, questions
about the transmission of mindfulness across cultural contexts
make clear the need to engage in a dialogue that can challenge
all of us, from every cultural tradition, to carefully examine our
deepest convictions about how it is best for human beings to be,
and thus how it is best for each of us to train our minds.
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